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Abstract 
A number of unstructured or partially structured electronic secondary markets exist 
to enable the sale and trading of goods between consumers. Many tend to be self- 
administering UseNet groups, or VVWW sites for niche products; however, there has 
been significant recent growth in the number of more general web-based markets of 
this kind. Apart from facilitating reliable and liquid ttrade of used goods, the existence 
of these markets can alter the desirability of new product, as well as products that 
are complementary/compatible, and one expects to see a proliferation of such trading 
forurns as Internet technology continues to become more widespread and reliable, and 
less expensive. We present a economic framework for analyzing how these electronic 
secondary markets affect the demand for a primary product. We then examine when 
it is optimal for a firm to operate a market of this kind, and when their presence is 
socially optimal. Surprisingly, we find that in a number of cases, the presence of these 
markets has a primary positive effect on the profitability of a new good; this leads us 
to conjecture that there will soon be a number of such trading forums operated by 
manufacturers of primary goods. We also find that in a majority of cases, it is feasible 
for a third-party intermediary to profitably operate such a market. Key parameters 
that affect the desirability of the market are the existing installed customer base, the 
cost of information technology, the durability of the products in question, their rate 
of technological obsolescence and the nature of customer preferences. 
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1 Introduction 
Commerce on the Internet has grown considerably over the last 4 years. Forrester 
Research (Maney, et. al, 1996) calls the Internet the fourth channel for exchanging 
information between suppliers, buyers, sellers and intermediaries, to a transaction (the 
other three channels being face-to--face communication, telephone communication and 
mailings). They also list their three reasons for the steep growth in business on the 
Internet : 
1. It removes telephonic time constraints, thereby making it possible for buyers 
and sellers to exchange information at any time. 
2. It enables media that exceed the richness of catalogs and other printed material. 
3. It provides individualized attention, much like a sales force. 
The term electronic commerce has become a catch-all phrase to describe all buy- 
ing and selling activities based either on the Internet, or ED1 transactions between 
businesses. However, an aspect of Internet based commerce that has not been stud- 
ied much is the profusion of Usenet newsgroups that allow buyers and sellers to post 
their bids for prodlicts that' are on sale. Usenet based newsgroups are only one of the 
many fora that bring together buyers and sellers. Many educational institutions have 
their own electronic bulletin boards, as do many regional non-profit organizations. 
In addition to the newsgroup-based facilities, there are also an increasing number of 
Web based services, including Barter Net and netTrader . These resellers are often 
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product-focused. One of our hypotheses is that such markets will continue to grow 
rapidly, sometimes with the active support of the producers of primary goods. 
In addition to the reasons cited by Forrester, these electronic marketplaces offer 
three benefits that most physical marketplaces cannot provide. For one, they can 
bring together geographically dispersed buyers and sellers, allowing them to transact 
either synchronously or asynchronously.. This increases the potential size of the 
market significantly. 
Secondly, electronic marketplaces allow for immediate offer revision and negoti- 
ation. In the period from December 1995 to July 1996, as many as a fifth of the 
transactions that took place on a newsgroup that brought together the buyers and 
sellers of used photographic equipment (rec.photo.rnarketplace) were characterized by 
revision of bids and negotiations between buyers and sellers that was instantaneously 
broadcast to all buyers and sellers on that forum. In addition, there were numerous 
e-mail messages exchanged privately between buyers and sellers prior to the conclu- 
sion of transactions (which by their very nature were not available to  us for analysis). 
There is little doubt, however, that this forum featured extensive bid-ask price revi- 
sions and negotiations. This allows for faster and smoother matching of supply and 
demand, and consequently, efficient price setting for a particular product. 
Finally electronic markets facilitate the storage and recall of the trading histo- 
ries of buyers and sellers. These can often be used as a quality signal by one or 
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both parties to  the transaction. For instance, most newsgroups archive versions of 
earlier messages, which can be searched by specialized search engines like Dejanews 
(http://www. dejanews. corn). These search engines can also provide a profile of the 
buyer or seller based on their past postings to a particular forum or fora. Many 
frequent buyers and sellers on these fora acquire reputations for accuracy, verifiabil- 
ity and reliability of their price and product quality descriptions and their payment 
behavior, which act as signals that reduce the measure of uncertainty associated with 
their trading behavior. In secondary markets for used goods (electronic or other- 
wise) in which buyers and sellers are exposed to the risk of opportunistic behavior 
induced by uncertainty and lack of verifiability of product and price claims, this is of 
considerable value. 
It has also been argued that authenticity (identity of the buyer/seller) integrity 
(verifiability and completeness of product/price information ) and non-repudiation 
(the ability to hold a buyer or seller to the terms of the transaction that they are 
committed to) are the three key features that will fuel the growth of electronic com- 
merce (Umbach, 1996). The advantages of an electronic market are that it allows for 
greater authenticity and integrity of buyer-seller interaction than, say, a (physical) 
bulletin board on which an individual may leave a scribbled not of a buy/sell offer. It 
is precisely these factors, along with the ability to produce a richer context of infor- 
mation at a very low cost (the marginal cost of an e-mail or web newsgroup posting 
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is negligible) that has made buying and selling in secondary electronic markets a 
commercially viable and popular activity. In recognition of the above trends, several 
market makers for primary market goods such as electronic auctioneers like On-Sale 
and Microwarehouse now have exclusive sites that act as secondary markets. 
Further, we have observed that the participant volume in certain Usenet sec- 
ondary markets have nearly doubled between December 1995 and December 1996. 
Driving this growth has been the rapid increase in the penetration of PC's and the 
ease of transacting on the web (made possible in part by popular software suites that 
integrate browsing, conferencing and creation of real time synchronous, shared con- 
texts, like Netscape's Collabra software, which allow rich information specification 
and negotiation possibilities). Forrester Research claims that the Internet provides 
a highly effective trading mechanism by giving buyers the ability to both determine 
their needs, and costlessly seek suppliers. Since search on an electronic medium is 
intrinsically less costly than physical search, this a considerable benefit for buyers 
and sellers. 
We therefore believe that electronic secondary markets oEer advantages that dis- 
tinguish them to a very significant extent from physical secondary markets; this 
difference is more than one of degree. When viewed against the backdrop of rapid 
technological advances, it becomes a difference of kind. This motivates our model 
of an electronic secondary market, and our analysis of its impact on prices of a new 
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good in the primary market. Since electronic secondary markets do not preclude, and 
are influenced by, the simultaneous existence of used goods and new goods, we will 
also examine the impact of the price of new goods on the price of used goods and the 
resulting behavior of buyers and sellers at equilibrium. 
In the models that follow, we analy~e whether the presence of an electronic sec- 
ondary market can have a positive impact on a firm's sales, and a positive impact 
on consumer welfare, and if so, when this effect is present. Since an electronic sec- 
ondary market for a particular product enables costless search for a used product, 
and, if operated effectively, ensures that the product purchased is not a 'lemon' (as 
discussed above), it increases consumer confidence levels in used-good purchase. It 
also makes the trade of a used good liquid. That any secondary market has these 
features is crucial; only electronic markets can simultaneously ensure quality, liquid- 
ity and costless search, and this is precisely the distinction between market kind and 
degree of efficiency that we alluded to earlier. 
Intuitively, therefore, there are at least two significant effects that a market of this 
kind can have on the sales of a primary good: 
1. It can reduce a firm's sales by causing potential buyers of a new good to buy a 
used good instead - since a reliable, liquid source of these products now exists 
2. They can increase a firm's sales by allowing existing owners (who would other- 
wise be stuck with an old good) to sell their old good at a fair price, and buy 
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a new good. 
Though it rnay appear that these two effects balance, this is almost never true. 
Even if the net demand effect balances out, there can be a price effect on the new 
good, thereby changing firm profits. Also, some of the buyers of a used good rnay 
not have been potential buyers of the new good, and hence it can also have a net 
demand effect on the sales of the new good. Evidently, a key driver here is the nature 
of consumer preferences for new and used goods. Other factors of consequence are 
the amount of value that the product loses with use (subsequently referred to as the 
durability of the product), the rate at which the firm introduces new products (which, 
ceteris paribus, is directly related to  the previous factor), and the size of the market 
- both existing owners, and potential buyers. 
2 A Model of Electronic Secondary Markets 
Our model examines a monopolist who produces a single durable product, and sells it 
in a market whose size we normalize to 1. The consumer valuations of a new product 
in any pcriod arc uniformly distributed from 0 to 1 (this is a widely used model of 
consumer preferences, and in the absence of a used product, generates a downward 
sloping linear demand curve). The valuation that the consumers place on a used good 
are uniformly distributed from 0 to 6, where S measures (inversely) the degradation 
in performance of the good. We refer to S as the durabilitg of the product. As 
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briefly mentioned earlier, the durability S has many possible drivers. It is affected by 
the intrinsic durability or reliability of the product (for instance, a television is more 
durable than a toothbrush), and is increasing in this factor. It is also affected by the 
rate at which new products are introduced. If a firm produces a new product every 
month, then the previous month's product is almost as good as this month's product, 
and hence a high rate of product turnover pushes S up. On the other hand, if a new 
product is introduced every few years, then S is likely to be lower. Finally, it is also 
affected by the rate of related technological progress (which is why, for instance, a PC 
would have a low value of 6, despite its relatively high reliability, and rapid product 
turnover. 
We assume that if a consumer has a valuation of 7) for a new good, then that 
consumer values a used good at 671. This is in agreement with the distributional 
assumptions made earlier, and ensures that consumer valuations of new and used 
goods are consistent. The firm has a constant marginal cost, which we normalize 
to zero. It decides on a price for the new good with perfect knowledge of the 
IT'his is a standard assumption in linear models of this kind; one can justify this easily by 
interpreting the valuations of consumers as their valuations net of marginal cost; since the firm is 
never going to price below marginal cost, considering those consumers for which this valuation is 0 
or positive and rescaling the distribution so that the upper limit is 1 will reduce the problem back 
to the one we currently are analyzing. It  does, however, restrict the price of the used good to being 
above marginal cost; hence, modifying this to incorporate positive costs will only strengthen results 
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percentage of the market that already owns an old good. Evidently, a consumer who 
does not own the product buys it only if her valuation 11 > p, where p is the price 
of the new product. Also, in the absence of a secondary market for old products, an 
existing customer buys the new good only if the value derived from the new good is 
greater than the value derived from the used good, or if: 
We first examine a single period model with an existing base of owners of an 
old good. At this point, the percentage of the market which owns an old product 
is exogenously specified. This can occur in a number of different situations; some 
factors that can contribute to this are a short-lived product, or a product for which 
it is expected that manufacturing may not be sustained beyond a single period. It is 
also a partial model of entry by a new firm into a market where there is an existing 
good similar to its new good (though we do not consider competitive effects at this 
point). 
Another reason for examining this model is that it forms the basic building block 
for a dynamic model. Even if the firm makes the product in many periods, and one 
models this in a multi-period setting, one would need to use some form of backward 
induction to determine the sequence of prices that the firm would charge The price 
that the firm charges in any period is a function of the durability 6, the distribution 
indicating the desirability of an electronic secondary market. 
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of customer preferences, and the current market situation i.e. the percentage of con- 
sumers who own used goods; precisely the model we are constructing. We represent 
the installed base of customers by those who have valuations greater than or equal 
t o h , O < h < l .  
2.1 Absence of an electronic secondary market 
We first consider the base case, where these is no secondary market, electronic or 
otherwise. The firm sets a price p for the new good to maximize its single period 
profits. This induces a demand q(p) and corresponding profits pq(p). The demand is 
not smooth - it depends on the relative values of p, h and h(1- 6). There are three 
possible cases: 
(2) P > h 
(ii) h(1 - 6) < p < h 
(iii) p < h(l  - 6) 
We derive the demand and profit functions for each of these cases, and then 
analyze what the optimal choice of p is for different values of h and 6. Recall that 
a buyer who does not own an old good will purchase the new one if her valuation is 
higher than p, and an existing owner will discard the old product and buy the new 
P one if her valuation is higher than --- 
1 - 6 '  
The first case (p 2 h) induces no new buyers, since all the potential buyers 
who do not own the good have valuations less than h, which is less than p. Hence, 
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Figure 1: Demand in the absence of a secondary market 
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as shown in Figure 1, the entire demand will come from existing owners who have 
valuations higher than ---- and this will induce a demand of q(p) = (1 - -1, P 1 - 6 '  1 - 6  
P 
and corresponding profits of p ( l  - -) . 1 - 6  
The second case [h(l - 6) < p < h)] induces both new buyers and existing 
owners to buy the good, as shown in figure l(b). Since p > h( l  - 6), which implies 
that - > h, there are existing owners who choose not to buy the new product. 1 - 6  
However, since p < h, there is positive demand from new buyers. The magnitude of 
P this demand is (h - p) . Hence, in this case, q(p) = (1 - -----) + (h - p) . 
1 - 6  
In the third case lit7 < h(1 - 6)j,all existing owners discard their old product and 
buy a new one (since ---- < h). Also, all other consumers with valuations greater 1 - 6  - 
than p will buy the product. The demand is therefore q(p) = (1 - h) + (h -p) = (1 -p )  . 
We refer to these three cases as the three price regimes the firm can choose. 
The demand function q(p) in the absence of a secondary market is summarized 
below. The profit function in each case is simply pq(p). 
P (I--) i f p 2  h (Price Regimel) 
1 - 6  
P q(p; h) = (1 - -) + (h - p) if h(1 - 6) < p < h (Price Regime 2) 1 - 6  
(1 -p)  if p < h( l  - 6) (Price Regime 3) 
The firm will choose the value of p which maximizes this profit function. We 
now determine the profit maximizing price. The problem is one of simple quadratic 
constrained maximization in each of the three cases. We summarize the results of 
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this optimization below 
I case 1 (i) 1 
Price p* 
Case 1 (ii) 
Profits ~ ( p * )  
Case 2 (i) 
Case 2 (iii) 
Case 2 (ii) 
(1 + h)( l  - 6) if (1 - 6) < h < 1 
2(2 - 6) (3 - 6) - (3 - 26) 
(1 + q2(1 - 6) 
4(2 - 6) 
h( l  - 6) if h > 1 (3 - 26) 
Case 3 (i) 
The reader can easily verify that these are accurate. The analysis proceeded as 
h(1- 6) - h2(1 - 6)2 
Case 3 (ii) 
follows. For each of the cases, the first order conditions were determined; the inequal- 
1 i f h >  1 2 2(1 - 6) 
ities in the Price column above represent the condition that separa,te the situations 
- 1 
4 
h( l  -6) if h 5 1 
2(1 - 6) 
in which the unconstrained optimum satisfies the constraints, and the situations in 
h( l  - 6) - h2(1 - 6)2 
which it does not. 
In the absence of the electronic secondary market, the optimal profit is therefore 
crucially dependent on the relative values of the installed base, and the product 
durability. To determine which of the cases is optimal, we first consider the case 
where the durability is not very low. Proofs of this result, and of subsequent lemmas 
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and propositions are in an appendix at the end of the paper. 
( 1 - 6 )  1 - 6  
< 
1 Lernrna 1 If 1 > 6 2  0.22, then ------ <  < ( 3  - 6 )  - 2 ( 3  - 26) - 2 ( 1 -  6 )  
This ordering allows us to examine sequentially which of the three price regimes is 
optimal for different va,lues of h .  The following result shows which of these is optimal 
for different values of h. 
1 - 6 1 - 6  Proposition 1 (i) If h 5 (dm - I ) ,  then, p* = 2 , X ( P * )  =  4 
(ii) 1f (dm--1) 5 h < 1 then p* = ( 1  + h) ( 1  - 6 )  ( 1  + h ) 2 ( 1  - 6 )  ( 3  - 26) ' 2(2 - 6 )  , " (P*)= q ( 2 - 6 )  
1 P (iii) If < h <  , then p* = h ( 1 -  6 ) ,  ~ ( p * )  = h ( 1 -  6 )  - h2(1  - 6 ) 2  ( 3  - 26) - 2(1  - 6 )  
(iv) If h 2 1 1 1 thenp*  = - , ~ ( p * )  = - 2 ( l -  6)' 2 4 
The regions of (h ,  6 )  for which each of the prices are optimal are depicted graph- 
ically in Figure 2. 
2.2 Presence of an electronic secondary market 
Now consider the case where there is an efficient electronic secondary market (hence- 
forth referred to as an ESM). This market may be either run by the firm, or by a third 
party intermediary. As in the earlier case, we consider an existing base of owners. 
The percentage of the market that owns an old product is still exogenously specified. 
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Figure 2: Optimal price for different durability and installed base 
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In addition to  the features discussed in the earlier case, in the current model, an ad- 
ditional type of transaction is enabled due to the existence of the electronic market. 
Existing owners of the product from prior purchase (we will refer to this as the used 
good from here onwards) can now sell it as a used good if they can find buyers for it 
in the ESM that are willing to pay them their desired price. Therefore, a buyer has 
two different buying options open to her in this period. She can buy a new good from 
the firm, or buy a used good from a first period buyer though the ESM. Further, a 
buyer who owns a used good will not buy another used good; we will also show that 
if she sells it at all, it will be to buy a new good. Any buyer who buys a new good 
will do so only if her valuation of the good 7) > p where p is the price of the new good. 
However, not all buyers whose valuations of the new good are greater than this price 
will buy the product, as some may derive higher value by buying the used good at 
the ESM price po. It is easy to show that the maximum price that the old good will 
fetch in a market is limited by the price of the new good (since no buyer would buy 
a used good at a price greater than that of the new good). A buyer who prefers the 
new good to buying the old good has a valuation that is characterized by: 
Also, an existing owner who wishes to sell the old good in the ESM and then buy 
a new one, has a valuation that is characterized by: 
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We continue to use h to indicate the installed base of customers whose valuations 
of the product in the earlier period was greater than or equal to h, 0 < h < 1. The 
firm sets the price p of the new good to maximize its profits, taking into account the 
expected activity in the electronic secondary market. This choice of p by the firm 
induces a price po for the used good. The price po (which is not a direct choice of the 
firm) is non-negative, and clears the market (i.e. the supply and demand for the used 
good at po are equal). If no positive market clearing price exists, then trade does not 
occur on the ESM. The values of p and po induce a demand q(p, po) for the new good, 
and corresponding profits pq(p, po) for the firm. 
A buyer who buys the used good, has a valuation that is given by: 
P - Po The demand for the new good therefore depends on the relative values of p, h, 1-6 
and @. The following lemma establishes a simple result that narrows the number of 6 
relevant cases significantly. 
P - Po Lemma 2 If p > ---- Po then - > p 1 - 6 6 
Now, we show that there are just three relevant situations: 
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P-Po < (2) P < m  
P - Po (ii) p < h < 1-6 
P - Po (iii) h < p < 1-6 
It is not necessary to consider other cases since they preclude the existence of 
trade in the ESM. If p > ------ Po then, by  ernm ma 2, - > p > - 1-6 6 - Po and the used 1 - S 
good would have no sales, since all buyers who would wish to buy the used good 
Po P - Po (71 > -) would prefer to buy the new good (since o '2). Also, if p < S 1-6 1-6' 
Po Po Po then, by Lemma 2, - < p, which implies that - < h, - < - S 6 - Po in cases (i) and S 1-6 
(ii); we shall subsequently show that (iii) cannot support an ESM, so the position of 
@ is irrelevant. 6 
P - Po Consider case (iii), h < p < results in the following demand: 
1-6 
To determine the market clearing price of the used good, we equate the demand 
for the used good to its supply: 
* 4(P) = 1 - (p + S(l - h)), 
Po 
so long as - < h, a,nd po > 0. 6 
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The firm's profits from this price are: 
Therefore, the profit maximizing price p*is 
Now, for p*to be a feasible price in the range, it must support a positive po, 
1 - 6  
However, po is positive only if 6p - (1 - h)( l  - 6)6 > 0, which reduces to h 2 
2 - 6 '  
1 - 6(1 - h )  1 - 6  Also, case (iii) requires that h < p*, or h < 2 , which reduces to h < 2 - 6 '  
Hence, this case is irrelevant (note that even if one set p = h, and looked for a solution, 
one gets the same contradiction, and hence even a boundary solution cannot be 
supported). 
The following proposition establishes when each of the other two cases occurs. 
The consumer behavior for these cases is summarized in Figure 3. 
Proposition 2 (a) If the firm wishes t o  have trade in the ESM, the optimal price 
P-Po p* satisfies p* < h, p* 5  , and results in the following prices and profits: 
1 - 6  
1 - 6(1 - h )  6[h(2 - 6) - (1 - 6)] [l - S(1 - h)12 
P* = - 2 -  i Po = 2 and ~ ( p * )  = 4 
1 - 6  (b) I f  h 5  , then it i s  optimal for the firm i f  no  trade to  occur in the ESM. 2 - 6 
1 - 6  1 + S 
< h < -  ( 4  I f ,  - 2 + 6 , then the ESM price po induced is such that p < h < 
1 + 6  P-Po < h (dl I f h  2 +n, then the ESM price po induces is  such that p < 1 - 6  - 
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Sell used aood. 
- 
Buvusedaood Buy new good buy new good 
P;ds P @-~J/r'f-d h 
Figure 3 (a) 
Keep Sell used good, 
Buyusedgood used good buy new good 
Figure 3fb) 
Figure 3: Consumer buying patterns with an electronic secondary market 
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ESM with case (i) 
Figure 4: When an ESM is feasible 
The results are summarized below, and in Figure 4. 
Range of h 
1-6 
h < -  2 - 6 
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Relevant Case 
1-6 l+6 
< h < -  
2 + 6 2-6- 
1+6 
h > =  
Non Relevant 
Optimal Price p* Profits n(p*) 
- 
[I - 6(1 - h)I2 
4 




Case (i) I - s(n - h) 2 
3 When are electronic markets optimal ? 
Having characterized the nature of firm profits as a function of the relative positions 
of h and 6, it is now possible to compare when the base case is dominated by the 
ESM case. We first examine when a firm should introduce an electronic secondary 
trading forum. Subsequently, we look at the welfare implications of ESMs. Finally, 
we discuss other costs, benefits and issues involved in the introduction of markets of 
this kind. 
3.1 Profit maximizing (when should a firm operate its own ESM) 
We now investigate when it is optimal for a firm to introduce an electronic market. 
Now, it is evident from Proposition 2 that ~ ( p * )  is always strictly less than a (the 
profits without an ESM h > 1 ) when a secondary market exists, and that an 2(1 - 6) 
1 - 6  
electronic secondary market is not feasible if h is less than -- . This immediately 2 - 6  
leads to our first result: 
1 1 - 6  
Proposition 3 If h > orb< t h e n  it i s  strictly sub-optimal for a 2(1 - 6) ' 2 - 6  
Jim to introduce a n  electronic secondary market .  
1 - 6  1 
This leaves us with just two regions: < h <  and 1 < h <  2 - 6  - (3 - 26)' (3 - 26) - 
1 for which we need to compare the results of Propositions 1 and 2 (since 
2f1- 6) \ I 
1 - 6  d m - 1  < -- for all 1 > 6 > 0). The comparison is straightforward, but 2 - 6  
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analytically messy - we equate profit functions, and look for the (h, 6) combinations 
that form the boundary between the regions where the presence of an ESM dominates, 
and the region where the absence of an ESM dominates. However, the equations by 
themselves are highly non-linear, and it is not possible to get any intuition from 
them, or perform any meaningful comparative statics analysis. Therefore, we plot 
boundaries in (h, 6) space, and examine when each situation is optimal. Interestingly, 
the (h, 6) values for which the ESM starts to dominate are remarkably close for both 
the cases (the curves almost coincide). Of course, one is relevant only for h < 1 (3 - 26) 
while the other is relevant for h < 1 
+ nevertheless, this virtual coinciding of (3 - 26) ' 
boundaries is something that we plan to  investigate more closely in the future. 
Our analysis is summarized in Figure 5, and interpreted below. 
An electronic secondary market is optimal from a firm's perspective if the dura- 
bility of the product is not low, or the rate of new product introduction is not low, 
and if the installed base of the product is fairly low. 
The dotted lines in Figure 5 represent the boundaries of the regions from Propo- 
1 1 - 6  
sition 1 and 2. As one can see, both h 2 (top left corner) and h 5 2(1 - 6) 2 - 6  
(bottom, decreasing from left to right) are well outside the region of interest. This 
result is even more interesting if one examines Figure 6, which replicates Figure 5 in 
a somewhat rea,listic area of the space; for reasonable values of h and 6 (i.e. when 
the product is not almost completely perishable, and when the firm's installed base 
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Figure 5: When an ESM is optimal 
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1 
ESM is optimal.'from 
the firm's perdpective 
(it increas6s profits 
from sales of the new 
ESM is sub- 
- optimal from the 
Figure 6: When an ESM increases profits in the primary market - a closer look. 
is 60% or less of the entire potential market) Here, we see that in almost half the 
possible cases, the presence of an electronic secondary market increases the profits of 
the firm from sales in the primary market (i.e. from sales of the new good). This 
ignores any commissions that the operator of the market (i.e. the firm in this case) 
could charge - it is simply from the price-demand effects the increased liquidity of 
the second-hand good has on the primary good's sales.] 
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Also, as the durability of the good increases, or as the rate of product turnover 
increases, the firm gets more value frorn the ESM - this is fairly intuitive. However, 
more interestingly, as the installed base decreases, the firm has a better chance of 
profiting from an ESM. One could argue that if the installed base is low then the 
lack of supply of the used good would drive the electronic secondary market price out 
of business. However, as one can see, this is not the case; the firm ends up reaping 
additional rents from sales of the primary good by simultaneously enabling sales in 
the ESM by causing a higher percentage of consumers to hold on to their used good); 
evidently, the price effect on profitability dominates the demand effect. 
3.2 Welfare maximizing (when can an intermediary operate an ESM) 
Our next task was to analyze when an interested third-party intermediary can operate 
an electronic secondary market profitably. We examined consumer surplus (the net 
excess value all consumers get after purchase) under the presence of an ESM: and 
then under the absence of an ESM. The rationale for this is that if the consumers were 
collectively strictly better off with an ESM, then they would be collectively willing 
to pay to get an intermediary to operate this market, by giving up a fraction of their 
surplus towards the operation of the market. 
This question was answered fairly easily. Whenever an electronic market is feasi- 
ble, then it turns out that it is strictly optimal frorn the consumers' perspective, and 
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hence an intermediary could operate the market profitably. This seems intuitively 
plausible, since (a) high-value consumers who repurchase now get some positive pay- 
ment for their old good, instead of throwing it away, and (b) low-value consumers 
who could not afford the new good can now afford the used good, thereby increasing 
their surplus from zero. 
One may wonder how this market can cause both the consumers and the firin to 
be simultaneously strictly better off in a fraction of the cases. Logically,if the firm's 
share of the pie (profits) go up, one may ask, then shouldn't the consumer's share 
of the pie (consumer surplus) go down. The reason is simple; here, when an ESM is 
operated, total surplus increases - hence the size of the pie increases, which enables 
both parties to be better off, even when their relative fractions change. 
However, it is not sufficient that one simply examine when consumer surplus is 
higher; in order for a third-party intermediary to operate the market, the surplus has 
to be higher even when the consumers pay a commission or brokerage fee; hence, one 
needs to estimate the relative magnitudes of the surplus. We are currently in the 
process of performing this analysis, and will have these results available shortly. 
3.3 Other issues - components, competition and repeated trade 
The model we have presented can be extended to analyze other economic settings that 
may alter the desirability of an ESM. Fbr instance, an ESM need not be restricted to 
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just selling used products; it could (and is) be a forum for trading allied components 
of a product. For instance, a liquid second-hand electronic market for Brand X 
computer monitors would increase the desirability of the complementary product 
(i.e. Brand X personal computers), and if the firm that manufactured the computers 
established a reliable, liquid, Web-based market of this kind, it could potentially 
increase consumer valuations of its primary good. Our preliminary analysis shows 
that this effect enhances the desirability of an electronic secondary market; we use 
our basic model, but with two complementary goods instead of a single product. 
Another key factor is that of competition. A firm facing a perfectly competitive 
market can compete more effectively by using an ESM as a quality factor; in the 
absence of similar moves by competitors, this could be a successful market-share cap- 
turing strategy. The effect is compounded if one considers the case of complementary 
goods as well; if there are many products of many types in the market, and a firm 
enables secondary trading in these goods exclusively for its customers, it could po- 
tentially increase profits. However, there are some liquidity/profit margin trade-offs 
here, which are not immediately resolvable. 
Finally, our model seamlessly becomes a period model in a multi-period setting. 
This is an important line of research, since one can relax the implicit assumption 
of uniform quality, and explicitly model the observed phenomenon of consumers' 
trading histories enhancing their reliability. Also, we have not considered the fact 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-97-23 
that a consumer's valuation of a good is positively affected by the possibility of being 
able to easily sell it for a fair price in the future - a dynamic model will enable the 
analysis of this effect as well. There is also the issue of used goods of diflerent ages 
that can be captured in such a model; however, at this stage, our analysis of this is 
research-in-progress. 
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
We have explicitly modeled the economic effects of an electronic secondary market 
on firm profits and consumer surplus. Our key insights are summarized below: 
1. When a firm has a very share of the potential consumer market, and faces a 
high rate of technological obsolescence, the existence of an electronic secondary 
market will tend to have a negative impact on the profitability of the firm's 
sales of new goods. 
2. However, in a significant fraction of situations, it is optimal for the manufacturer 
of a product or set of products to operate an electronic market which enables 
the trade of their used goods or componerlts. Rather than cannibalizing sales 
of new goods, this can actually have a positive effect on the profits from new 
goods. This effect is positive even when the customers ignore the benefits from 
easier future sales - simply the existence of the market to sell current used 
products can benefit the firm. 
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3. The desirability of these markets from the firm's perspective is enhanced when: 
the durability of their product is high, or 
the rate at which they introduce new versions of their product is high, and 
the share they have of the product market is higher. 
4. The presence of these electronic forums are almost always optimal from the 
perspective of the consumer; hence, in cases where the firm does not have enough 
of an incentive to establish the market, we expect a third-party intermediary 
to run such a market. The emergence of a number of such electronic channels 
for used goods indicates that this has been recognized to some extent. 
5. The establishing of an ESM can improve a firm's competitive position in an 
oligopoly; hence, we expect that this will emerge as a new way that a firm can 
use information technology for competitive advantage in the near future; how- 
ever, it is likely that only the first few movers will gain any competitive rents 
from this move. 
Our current research includes explicitly modeling the effects of trading histories 
on the operation of the market, using a game-theoretic model. There is also the issue 
of imperfect correlation between the valuations of new and used goods, which can be 
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captured by imposing a noise factor on our current model. This could also proxy for 
quality variance in the used goods. Finally, we also will be investigating the relative 
merits of different trading mechanisms in ESM's; though determining a market clear- 
ing price is the only logical static solution, it appears that a dynamic rnodel could 
involve interpersonal exchanges of information, and other market divisions, that could 
affect firm profitability and welfare in very interesting ways. 
5 Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: The two outer inequalities are true for all 6 in [ O , 1 ) .  
The  middle inequality is  satisfied at equality for two values of 6 ,  of which the only 
5 - J i S  fractional value i s  6 = 7 m 0.22. The  result follows immediately from the fact 
1 - 6 .  1 
that - zs decreasing in 6, while i s  increasing i n  6. 
2 (3 - 26) 
Proof of Proposition 1: I n  each internal for h, the firm chooses one of the 
three price regimes - the one which gives it the highest profits. W e  consider each of 
the intervals: 
- 6, : The profits under each of the price regimes are summarized (A) h 5 - -(3 - 6) 
below: 
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/ Price Regime / Optimal Price Optimal Profit Level ! 
These figures are obtained by referring to  the table of prices and profits, and using 
( i i )  h(l  - 6 )  < p < h 
the corresponding values. Comparing profit levels, one sees that ( i)  is  always superior 
t o  (ii), since ( i )  represents the optimal value of the profit equation in (22). Comparing 
p* = h 
(i) and (iii), we see that (iii) dominates ( i )  only i f  1 1 
2 + 2 &  ' < 2 - a & .  
( 1  - 6 )  < However, since 1 (i) is  dominant. ( 3 - 6 )  2+2&' 
( 1  - 6 )  1 - 6 < h < -  
- 2 : The  profits under each of the price regimes are sum- 
h2 
T* = h - ( 1  - 6 '  
(ii) always dominates (iii), since (ii) represents the optimum in this interval, and 
is hence at least as good as the values of the objective at the boundaries. Now, (ii) i s  
better than f i )  if h 2 ( d m -  1 )  (this i s  obtained by solving for the h that equates the 
1 - 6  ( I 6 )  q J Z - 6 - 1 ) < -  profits in (ii) and (2)). Also, one can easily verify that -(3 - 6 )  - 2 
marized below: 
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Price Regime 
(i) P > h 
(i i)  h(l - 6 )  2 p < h 
(iii) p h ( l  - 6 )  
Optimal Price 
1 - 6  p* = 
p* = 
(1 + h ) ( l  - 6 )  
2(2  - 6 )  
p* = h(1 - 6 )  
Optimal Profit Level 
1 - 6  
T* = 
T* =: 
( 1  + h ) 2 ( 1  - 6 )  
4 (2  - 6 )  
T* = h ( 1 -  6) - h2(1  - 6)2  
for 0 < 6 < 1 (for instance, by a plot in Mathematics). Hence, ( i )  is  better if 
1 - 6 
h < - ( d m  - I) ,  and (ii) i s  the dominant solution, at least upto h = -. 2 
1 - 6  1 ((7 T < h < : The  profits under each of the price regimes are sum- ( 3  - 26) 
marized below: 
/ Price Regime / Optimal Price I Optimal Prqfit Level / 
The proof here is  trivial. (ii) represents the optimal solution to  maximizing p[( l  - 
P 
-) + (h - p)] , the profit function under price regime 2. (i) and (iii) represent the 
1 - 6  
h2 
'Tr*=h-- (1 - 6) 
'Tr * = (1 + h)2(1 - 6) 
4(2 - 6) 
I 
values of this function at p = h and p = h(l  - 6) respectively; evidently, (ii) i s  at 
(i) P 2 h 
(ii) h( l  - 6) < p < h 
least as good as (i)  and (iii) 
p* = h 
p* = 
( l + h ) ( 1 - 6 1  
2(2 - 6) 
1 1 
< h <  ( D ) ( 3 -  26) - : The  profits under each of the price regimes are 2(1 - 6) 
summarized below: 
There are only two distinct cases here. Equating the profit functions and solving 
1 - 6 1 for h ,  one sees that (i) dominates if h < which is less tha,n (3 - 36 + )' (3 - 26) ' 
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Hence, (ii)/(iii) (which are identical in this case) dominates in the specified region. 
1 
- 6 )  : The profits under each of the price regimes are summarized 
below: 
/ Price Regime / Optimal Price / Optimal Prqfit Level 1 
/ (ii) h ( l  - 6 )  5 p 5 h 1 p* = h ( 1  - 6 )  1 71-* = h ( 1  - 6 )  - h 2 ( 1  - 6)2  1 
(iii) i s  evidently dominant, as it represents the global opt imum of p ( l  - p ) ,  which 
i s  the highest possible profits the firm can make for any value of h .  This completes 
the proof. 
(iii) p 5 h ( 1  - 6 )  
P - Po Proof of Lemma 2 p >------ 
1 - 6  ==+ ~ ( 1  - 6 ) > P -Po  
==+ -p6 > -po==+ po> p6 
and the result follows immediately. 
l + 6 .  1 - 6  1 - 6  Proof of Lemma 3 -zs always greater than 
2 + 6  
'J6 E [0,1]. Also,  2 - 6  2 - 36 
1 + 6  
-- > 0 i f  6 > % or if 6 < -2. The result follows. 
2 + 6  - 
1 p* = - 
2 
Proof of Proposition 2 W e  have eliminated case (2); hence the only option 
we h,ave is that p* < h ,  p* < '2 (cases (ii) and (iii)). Consider case (ii). The 
1 - 6  
demand for the new good i s  still 
1 
r* = - 
4 
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and therefore the analysis proceeds as in case (i), yielding the secondary market 
price: 
po = Sp-  ( 1  - h ) ( l  - S)S, 
and the optimal price level for the new good, 
The  optimal profit level is  obtained by computing p*q(p*), and works out t o  be 
1 - 6  
Now, po 2 0 + 6p - ( 1  - h ) ( l  - S)S > 0,  which reduces t o  h > . Hence Now, 2 - S 
1 - 6  for p* to  be in the required region, we require that h > p* , or h > --- which is 2 - 6' 
consistent with po > 0. The condition p* < P* - Po l + S  reduces to  h < -1 - 6  2 + S 
Now consider case (2). The demand from repeat buyers i s  1 - h ,  and the demand 
for the new good from new buyers i s  h -  - " ,  yielding a total demand of 
1 - 6  
The demand for the used good i s  ' -  --- -- - - To determine the market clearing 
1 - 6  S 
price, we equate supply to  demand. Supply of the used good i s  ( 1  - h); hence, the 
market clearing condition i s  
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which again reduces to 
As  is evident, the demand equations are identical to case (ii); hence the optimal 
prices and profits are the same. The only difference here is that p* > ' *  which 1-6 
l+6 
reduces to h > -
2 i- 6' 
Therefore, the firm will set a price p* 5 h, and depending on the value of h, the 
market clearing price po will correspond either to case ( i )  or case (ii). Since the firm 
[I - S(l - h)I2 1-6 
can achieve its optimal profit level 
4 
for all h > --- , there is no need 
2-6 
to examine boundary solutions, as they are bound to be inferior. This completes the 
proof. 
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